The Gift of Life: New Laws, Old Dilemmas, and the Future of Organ Procurement by Moore, Juliana S.
The University of Akron
IdeaExchange@UAkron
Akron Law Review Akron Law Journals
July 2015
The Gift of Life: New Laws, Old Dilemmas, and the
Future of Organ Procurement
Juliana S. Moore
Please take a moment to share how this work helps you through this survey. Your feedback will be
important as we plan further development of our repository.
Follow this and additional works at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview
Part of the Medical Jurisprudence Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Akron Law Journals at IdeaExchange@UAkron, the
institutional repository of The University of Akron in Akron, Ohio, USA. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Akron Law Review by an authorized administrator of IdeaExchange@UAkron. For more information, please
contact mjon@uakron.edu, uapress@uakron.edu.
Recommended Citation
Moore, Juliana S. (1988) "The Gift of Life: New Laws, Old Dilemmas, and the Future of Organ Procurement,"
Akron Law Review: Vol. 21 : Iss. 4 , Article 5.
Available at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol21/iss4/5
THE GIOT OF LIFE: NEW LAWS, OLD DILEMMAS, AND THE
FUTURE OF ORGAN PROCUREMENT
The moonless midnight sky was still pouring a steady cold rain when the
rescue squads arrived. The police were sealing off the area. A squad car's
flashing red and blue lights passed across three lifeless bodies that were pulled
from the wreckage of one car. In the other lane, paramedics worked feverishly
to stabilize two critically injured survivors.
Fifteen minutes away, in a hospital across town, a mother and father share
a lonely vigil with their critically ill seventeen year old daughter. They hope
and pray that a kidney will become available soon: without it, their daughter
will die.
Both teens from that night's accident died in the emergency room. Their
grief-stricken parents cling together as they journey down the empty hospital
corridor, numbed by the tragedy. The only comfort they find in their horrible
loss rests in the knowledge that somewhere across town, a teenage girl will
live again, and a blind mother will see her baby for the first time. Through
death, their children live on.
In Ohio, the recent enactment of the required request law has already helped
grieving families to grapple with a loved one's death.' Here and across the na-
tionI modifications to organ donation statutes may provide the impetus to change
the way a seemingly willing, but apprehensive population views organ dona-
tion.' But the statutes governing this area are only one component of the
fascinating concept of "giving life through death." Because a wealth of material
already exists detailing narrow aspects of this area, the purpose of this com-
ment is to present the reader with an informative overview of organ donation
as it currently exists. Part I of this comment discusses the Uniform Anatomical
Gift Act and Ohio's organ donation statute; Part II addresses the problems con-
fronted in defining death; Part III examines the donation-transplant process;
and, Part IV focuses on the future.
I. THE LAWS SURROUNDING ORGAN DONATION
A. The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act
As medical technology advanced,4 the need for a uniform law governing
I Prottas, The Rules for Asking and Answering: The Role of Law in Organ Donation, 63 U. DET. L. Rv.
183 (1985).
2 See generally Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, 8A U.L.A. 16 (1986) [hereinafter UAGA].
3 Over seventy percent of all Americans have consistently demonstrated a willingness to donate their organs
when polled. However, when specific organs, or when donating a deceased's relative's organs are men-
tioned, the positive response drops to fifty-six and thirty-six percent respectively. See Lee, The Organ
Supply Dilemma: Acute Responses to a Chronic Shortage, 20 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PRoBS. 363, 367 (1986).
4 Dunphy, The Story of Organ Transplantation, 21 HASTINGs L.J. 67. 94 (1969).
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organ donation became increasingly apparent.' In August, 1967,6 a conference
of the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws set out to address the problem.
The result was the nation's first organ procurement statute - the Uniform Ana-
tomical Gift Act (UAGA). Drafted in July, 1968,8 the UAGA's fundamental pur-
pose was to provide a "comprehensive approach to organ donation." 9 The stat-
ute's aimed to facilitate this goal by providing the legal framework under which
donations could take place, 0 while maintaining respect for an individual's right
to control the disposal of his body after death."I In 1969, thirty-nine states and
the District of Columbia 2 adopted the Act, and by 1971, the remaining eleven
states followed suit, adopting the Act relatively unchanged from its original
form.' 3
The drafters of the UAGA were faced with the challenge of balancing several
competing interests.' 4 Among these were protecting the wishes of the deceased,
acknowledging the wishes of the surviving family, and recognizing society's
need for human organs together with the state's interest in executing successful
organ procurement procedures.' 5 Encompassing those concerns were a cluster
of legal questions.' 6 These ranged from elementary procedural questions, to
legal and ethical concerns over what rights the surviving family possessed.'
7
The UAGA attempted to address these questions and other aspects of organ
donation within its structure.' 8
Since it has served as a national model for legislators in drafting state
statutes, a brief survey of the Act is useful in understanding its scope.' 9 Basically,
the UAGA is divided into seven major sections which detail procedures for
donating organs and other body parts.20 Section 1 defines major terms that ap-
pear in the Act's subsequent provisions, 2' while Section 2 provides donor
Id. The number of kidney transplants increased by a factor of seventeen between 1967 and 1983. Lee,




9 Kramer, The Professional's Role in Helping the Client and the Family Deal with Death, 1986 N.Y. ST.
B.J. 22.
IoDunphy, supra note 4, at 95.
11 Leavell, Legal Problems in Organ Transplant, 44 Miss. L.J. 865, 866 (1973).
12Comment, A Survey of the Legal Aspects of Organ Transplantation, 50 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 510, 516 (1973).
13M. In 1952, England became the first common law jurisdiction to address the removal of cadaver organs
in its Corneal Grafting Act. See Lee, supra note 3, at 371.





19 Comment, supra note 12.
20 UAGA 8A U.L.A. (1986).
21 UAGA § I, 8A U.L.A. 30 (1986). See Appendix A for the UAGA in its entirety.
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criteria, 22 limiting donations to individuals at least eighteen years of age.2 3 Also
included in this section is a prioritized list of family members who are author-
ized to donate the decedent's organs.24
Donees of anatomical gifts, 25 as well as the purposes for which a gift may
be used are addressed in Section 3.26 Section 4 states that a gift may be made
by will 27 or by signing a donor card in the presence of two witnesses.2" Ex-
amples of donor forms are also included.2 9 The remaining portions of the Act
allow for the delivery of the gift-authorizing document, 30 the written or oral
amendment or revocation of a gift3 and outline the rights and duties of the
donee upon death of the donor.3 2 Finally, sections 8-11 detail information such
as the statute's effective date33 and proper citation form.
34
Although the UAGA has been adopted nationwide,3" subsequent variations
have been made to this model in many states.36 For example, Illinois adds to
Section 1 its own subsection (g) defining death,37 while California adds a sec-
tion dealing with faith healing sects.3 Perhaps the most consistent of the early
additions to the Act were those providing for eye enucleation.39 However, most
deviations were minor.40 Today, the most apparent modifications in state statutes
are those which define death, outline organ procurement protocol, and pro-
hibit organ sales.4 '
Despite its positive aspects, it cannot be denied that the Act is imperfect.42
22UAGA § 2. 8A U.L.A. 34 (1986).
211(1.
24f/j
5A donee may mean the organ recipient or one of a variety of institutions which may accept the gift.
UAGA § 3. 8A U.L.A. 41 (1986).
26 1,/.
27 UAGA § 4. 8A U.L.A. 43 (1986).
28/ j
29 UAGA § 4. 8A U.L.A. 43 (1986).
30UAGA § 5. 8A U.L.A. 55 (1986).
31 UAGA § 6, 8A U.L.A. 57 (1986).
32 UAGA § 7, 8A U.L.A. 59 (1986).
3 1UAGA § 8-11, 8A U.L.A. 67 (1986).
341d.
35For a complete listing of jurisdictions adopting the UAGA see UAGA, 8A U.L.A. 15-16 (1986).




40 Id. For example, Alaska sets its minimum age for donation at nineteen years of age, while Oregon substitutes
"adult" to designate a person eighteen years of age or older. UAGA, 8A U.L.A. 36, 39 (1986). Variations
of this nature may be examined in full following each section of the UAGA.
41d.
4 2 See generally Prottas. supra note 1. 3
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One of the Act's shortcomings lies with the donor card system 43 Even though
a signed donor card is a legally binding document,"4 almost no hospital or organ
procurement facility will remove a donor's organs unless it can obtain consent
from the next of kin.45 In fact, only four states presently uphold the donor card
as superior to the rights of the survivors.4 6 Although the UAGA specifically
protects physicians and donees from liability if the organ is removed in good
faith,4 7 most physicians are unwilling to become sandwiched in conflicts be-
tween family members, especially if the family is informed that a loved one's
organs have been removed in accordance with a donor card." Furthermore,
many believe that it is proper for the family to have the last word on dona-
tion.4 9 Consequently, the large supply of organs for transplant, which the Act
was intended to provide, has not materialized. 50
Another major criticism of the Act has been its failure to furnish physi-
cians with a legally and medically acceptable definition of death.5 Because
various definitions of death exist5 2 it is impossible to determine from the Act
4' 3d. at 185. See also Schwartz. Bioethical and Legal Considerations in hicreasing the Supply of Trans-
plantable Organs: From UAGA to "Baby Fte," 10 AM. J.L. & MED. 397, 405-406 (1985).
"4Prottas, supra note I, at 185.
411 j. at 188.
461Lee. supra note 3, at 379.
47 Leavell. supra note II, at 879-80. Because of the UAGAs provision of limited liability, not much case
law has arisen in general organ procurement matters. However. there are some related instances where
suit has been brought. In Williams v. Hoffman, 66 Wis. 2d 145. 233 N.W.2d 844 (1974), the plaintiff's
wife was admitted to the hospital with a brain hemorrhage. She was placed on a respirator and was pro-
nounced dead at 8:20 a.m., almost two days later. The plaintiff authorized the removal of his wife's organs
(or transplant purposes. After making funeral arrangements, he learned that his wife's body was not at
the morgue. The plaintiff discovered that his wife had been sustained on the respirator until 9 a.m.. and
that her organs were removed at 8:35 a.m.. despite the fact that she had been declared dead at 8:20 a.m.
The plaintiff brought suit alleging wrongful conduct in connection with the removal of his wife's organs.
In the pertinent portion of this case, the court held that the terms of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act
did not apply to "treatment of the donor prior to death" and that the limited liability section was not
a valid defense in this matter. Williams, 66 Wis. 2d at 150, 233 N.W.2d at 846. In Colton v. New York
Hosp., 98 Misc.2d 957, 414 N.Y.S.2d 866 (N.Y.Sup. 1979), the plaintiff donated a kidney to his dying
brother. Prior to surgery, he signed a document that was a covenant not to sue the hospital in connection
with the transplant surgery. The plaintiff did not recover consciousness until ten days after the surgery.
and discovered that he was deaf as a result of the surgery. The plaintiff and his wife brought suit against
the hospital for medical malpractice and loss of consortium. The court found the covenant valid, holding
that it was intended to protect physicians from non-negligent conduct under circumstances where a patient
voluntarily agrees to undergo an inherently dangerous procedure. Colton, 98 Misc.2d at 969, 414 N.Y.S.2d
at 876. However, the agreement did not bar the wife's claims because she had not signed the document.
i. For a discussion of the rescue doctrine as applied to organ donors, see Salhus, Survey of New York
Practice, 57 ST. JOHNS L. REv. 805. 862 (1983).
48 Prottas. supra note I, at 188.
49/d. at 186.
0Schwartz, supra note 43, at 404-05.
51 Comment, supra note 12, at 521; Leavell, supra note I1, at 883; Schwartz, supra note 43, at 416. Death
is discussed in detail in Part II of this comment.
5 2Smith, Legal Recognition of Neocorrical Death, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 850, 850-51 (1986).
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which standard is to be applied.53 As a result, many states,54 including Ohio, 5
have adopted "whole brain death" 5 6 as the standard for determining death5
A corollary issue to these concerns is the problem of protecting the rights of
the near-dead.58
Still other critics maintain that the UAGA's greatest failure is not in its lack
of definitions, but in its inability to substantially increase the supply of trans-
plantable organs.59 These critics suggest that the reason for the supply shortage
is the public's lack of awareness 60 and its unwillingness to donate.6' Much of
this unwillingness has been attributed to religious convictions 62 and the fear
of death.6 3 Proposals to remedy the situation have ranged from structuring new
amendments to the Act 64 which would permit organ sales,65 to requiring com-
pulsory donation.66
Although these criticisms are legitimate, the significance of the Act can-
not be underestimated. Despite its shortcomings, it has helped to save thousands
of lives, encouraged medical research, and provided a model for state legis-
lators.6 7 Without a model from which to work, chaos, rather than uniformity
may have resulted, crippling any attempt at a national organ procurement ef-
fort. Furthermore, at the time of its inception, it would have been difficult for
its drafters to anticipate and provide for every contingency within the Act when
constant improvements in medical technology were redefining the outlook on
organ procurement. In attempting to resolve these lingering concerns, many
53UAGA, 8A U.L.A. (1986).
54Prottas, supra note 1, at 189.
s Comment, Classification of Critically Ill Patients: A Legal Examination, 24 ST. Louis U.L.J. 514, 552-53
(1980). See generally OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2108 (Baldwin 1969 & Supp. 1986).
56Brain death is defined as either (I) irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions, or
(2) irreversible cessations of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem. Schwartz, supra
note 43, at 418.
s7Smith, supra note 52.
S8 Quay, Utilizing the Bodies of the Dead, 28 ST. Louis U.L.J. 889, 896-97 (1984).
59 Comment, Retailing Human Organs Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 J. MARsHALL L. REV.
393, 399 (1983). See also OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2108.30 (Baldwin Supp. 1986).
6 0 Id. at 403.
6! Id. Compare with Lee, supra note 3, where polls indicate that the willingness to donate differs depend-
ing upon the questions asked.
62 Bazil & Goldberg, ISBA Moves to Eliminate Roadblocks to Organ Donation and Transplantation, 1985
ILL. B.J. 372, 374 [hereinafter cited as Bazil]. See also Prottas, supra note I, at 188; Note, The Sale of
Human Body Paris, 72 MICH. L. REv. 1182, 1210 (1974).
63Bazil, supra note 62.
64Quay, supra note 58, at 900.
65 Note, supra note 62, at 1216. Organ sales are discussed in more detail in Part IV of this comment.
66Dukeminier, Supplying Organs for Transplant, 68 MICH. L. REv. 811, 837-38 (1970). See also Note,
Compulsory Removal of Cadaver Organs, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 693, 705 (1969).
7 Dunphy, supra note 4, at 95.
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states like Ohio, have enacted new provisions to their organ procurement
statutes.
68
B. Ohio's Anatomical Gift Act
In Ohio, Chapter 2108 of the Revised Code provides the regulations for
making an anatomical gift.69 Its provisions are substantially the same as those
of the UAGA.70 Section 2108.01 defines various terms which appear in the Code,
such as storage facility, decedent donor, hospital, and party, Section 2108.02
permits eighteen-year-old individuals to make a gift, and authorizes the next
of kin to do so as well. 2 This section also outlines what a donee may do73 and
expressly states that the coroner's rights are paramount to those of the donee. 4
Section 2108.03 states that organs may be donated to physicians, hospitals, ac-
credited medical or dental schools, storage banks, or even to a specific in-
dividual.75 Along the same lines, Section 2108.07 gives the donee discretion
to accept or reject a gift.7 6
The remaining sections of the Code address procedural matters. For ex-
ample, Section 2108.04 states that a gift may be made by will or by signing
a valid driver's license or donor card? 7 Section 2108.05 provides for delivery
of these documents, while Section 2108.0678 addresses amending or revoking
a gift. Other related Sections in this Chapter include: 2108.21, which provides
for blood donation; 2108.11 which states that furnishing blood is not a sale;
and 2108.071, (added in 1975) which provides for eye enucleationY9
The most important alterations to the Code appear in the 1986 supplement80
Minor changes in text appear in Section 2108.10, which incorporates a redesigned
donor form that now permits the donor to specify how his body should be dis-
posed of after donation.8' Similarly, Section 2108.21 reduces the minimum blood
6 8See generally OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2108.01-2108.10 (Baldwin 1969 & Supp. 1986).
69/d.
70UAGA § I, 8A U.L.A. 30 (1986).
7' See generally OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2108 (Baldwin 1969 & Supp. 1986).
72OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2108.02 (Baldwin 1969 & Supp. 1986).
71See id. at § 2108.02 (C).
74See id, at § 2108.02 (E).
71OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2108.03(D) (Baldwin 1969).
76 0HIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2108.07 (Baldwin 1969).
77OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2108.04 (Baldwin 1969 & Supp. 1986). As of 1985, forty-five states provided
organ donation forms on the back of driver's licenses. Schwartz, supra note 43, at 405-406. The states
which do not are Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Nebraska, Nevada and Pennsylvania. Id. Only Michigan,
North Dakota, and Wyoming do not distribute donor cards. Id. at 406. Illinois, on the other hand, encloses
donation literature with its driver's license renewal forms. Bazil, supra note 62, at 373.
7
sOHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2108.06 (Baldwin 1969).
'9OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2108.21, 2108.11, 2108.71 (Baldwin 1969 & Supp. 1986).
80See generally OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2108.021 (procurement protocol), and § 2108.30 (definition of
death) (Baldwin Supp. 1986).
81OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2108.10 (Baldwin Supp. 1986).
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donor age to seventeen, and affixes a clause that controls blood donations in
schools. 82 Overall, four notable additions have been made to the Code.83 Sec-
tion 2108.53 allows for the removal of the pituitary gland and Section 2108.60
allows a coroner to remove corneas from the decedent.84 However, the two most
significant additions are found in Section 2108.30, which defines death, and
in Section 2108.021, which codifies organ procurement protocol. 5
Ohio has adopted the whole brain death definition of death.86 Revised Code
Section 2108.30 states in part:
An individual is dead if he has sustained either irreversible cessation of
circulatory and respiratory functions or irreversible cessation of all func-
tions of the brain, including the brain stem, as determined in accordance
with accepted medical standards. If the respiratory and circulatory func-
tions of a person are being artificially sustained, under accepted medical
standards a determination that death has occurred is made by a physician
by observing and conducting a test to determine that the irreversible cessa-
tion of all functions of the brain has occurred.
This definition provides physicians with an accurate criteria for determin-
ing death87 Its adoption was requisite to ensuring the smooth operation of the
statute.8 Prior to this time, a legally and medically acceptable definition of
death did not exist in Ohio, making physicians skeptical about their liability
for decisions made in organ procurement situations, despite the Code's limited
liability provisions and the lack of litigation in these cases.89 It has been sug-
gested that a uniform determination of death throughout the United States will
only help to enhance the availability of transplantable organs.90
Perhaps the most significant addition to the Code is the Ohio legislature's
adoption of House Bill 770 - the Required Request law, which, in effect, forces
hospitals to ask the decedent's family for his organs. 9' The law was enacted
in response to statistics indicating that only twenty percent of families who had
82 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2108.21 (Baldwin Supp. 1986).
83 See generally OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2108 (Baldwin Supp. 1986).
84Id.
851d.
"6Ohio Revised Code Section 2108.30, which defines death, became effective on March 15, 1982. OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2108.30 (Baldwin Supp. 1986).
87Smith, supra note 52, at 854-55. See also Prottas, supra note 1, at 188.
88 Part II of this comment addresses the problems encountered in making a determination of death under
the UAGA.
89 Lee, supra note 3, at 378. Factors which have been attributed to minimal litigation in transplant matters
are: the close relationship between a physician and his patient; the lack of a definite standard of care,
and, the patient's low expectation of success. Id. at 378-79.
9"Smith, supra note 52, at 856.
91 Akron Beacon Journal, Dec. 21, 1987, at C3, col. 2. 7
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lost loved ones were approached by hospitals to donate organs.9 2 Briefly, the
new law requries that hospitals develop protocols for organ and tissue removal
in conjunction with other organ procurement organizations. 93 The enactment
states that hospitals must identify the circumstances under which an organ may
be requested94 and requires that families of potential donors must be made aware
of the option to donate. 5 Organ Procurement Agency officials or representatives
are in the primary position to make the request,96 however, hospital administrators
may also do so. 7 Under required request, families of potential donors may not
be approached if the decedent had made it clear that organ donation was against
his wishes. 8 Today, over forty states have enacted required request laws99 and
administrators involved in organ procurement are pleased with the results to
date, and are hopeful that the organ supply will steadily increase as a result. 00
C. The National Organ Transplant Act
Stemming from its concern about the organ supply shortage, which it at-
tributed to a lack of organization in the nation's procurement efforts, Congress
created the National Organ Transplant Act in 1984.101 The primary purpose
of the Act was to develop a national organ network and transplant registry that
would evaluate the effectiveness of transplant procedures. 02 Through the Act,
Congress also hoped to establish Organ Procurement Organizations (OPOs)
patterned after the successfully operated independent kidney Organ Procure-
ment Agencies (OPAs). 10 3 Unfortunately, to some degree, the Act has failed. 0 4
The task force it established was given discretion to study the issues it deemed
important,10 5 and as a result, the task force neglected to seek solutions to resolve
the serious demand for organs. 10 6 The force's lack of direction suggests that
its true value was in Congress' willingness to expand the government's role
in organ procurement, rather than its effectuating an increase in the number
of transplantable organs.107
92Bill Lives On, HOUSE CALLS, Autumn 1987, at 19. Ohio Revised Code Section 2108.021, which outlines
organ protocol procedures, became effective on March 17, 1987. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2108.021 (Baldwin
Supp. 1986).
93OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2108.02(1)(b) (Baldwin 1969 & Supp. 1986).






99 Bill Lives On, supra note 92.
10°Akron Beacon Journal, supra note 91. See also Ehrle interview, infra note 184.
1o1 Lee, supra note 3, at 387-88.
I2/d. at 388.
O3 1d.
104 1d. at 388-90.
I3d. at 390.
106 1d. at 389.
°
07 Id. at 390. The reader may infer the Act's failure after reading pages 388-390.
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In spite of the deficiencies these combined acts present, progress continues
to be made in the organ procurement system as its objectives and its role in
society is refined. One long awaited improvement is discussed in the following
section.
II. DEATH
A. What is Death?
"Death is an event where medicine, religion and law meet around a human
being in his last minutes."' 0 8 The supernatural has been associated with death
and corpses from the earliest of times, 109 and though there are no property rights
in a dead body," 0 the law has always protected the right of possession for burial
purposes."1 "Death triggers important legal consequences." 
12
The problem with death is how and when it occurs. Diverse definitions
have attempted to give it meaning. Black's Law Dictionary defines death as,
"The cessation of life; permanent cessations of all vital functions and signs."' 13
Death has also been described as termination or extinction' 14 the "* . . suspen-
sion or cessation of vital processes of the body, as heart beat and respiration,"115
and, as an "[i]rreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including
the brain stem . . ,, 116 Advances in life support technology have only com-
pounded the problem. 17 It has been stated that "[s]ociety is willing to declare
a patient dead when there is no possibility of recovery of consciousness,"" 8
but the advent of life support systems suggests that "[t]he modern definition
of death must often depend on whether the mechanical devices are minimizing
the suffering, or preserving the life of a potentially salvageable individual, or
whether they are merely sustaining the existence of a hopelessly tortured and
essentially destroyed entity."" 9
081Biorck, When is Death? 1968 Wis. L. REv. 484, 497.
109 Sideman & Rosenfeld, Legal Aspects of issue Donations From Cadavers, 21 SYRACUSE L. REv. 825,
830 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Sideman].
110See generally 14 0. JUR. 3d Cemeteries & Dead Bodies § 1, 5 (1979). Although there were no proper-
ty rights in a dead body at common law in England, a trust concept existed whereby the person who claimed
the body was said to be holding it in "trust" for the benefit of relatives and friends. Wasmuth & Stewart,
Medical and Legal Aspects of Human Organ Transplantation, 14 CLEV. MARSHALL L. REv. 442, 450, 452.
American courts subsequently adopted this concept. Id. at 452. Early American cases indicate that a quasi-
property right vested in the next of kin and arose out of the duty to bury the dead, but that view was
later changed to a qualified property right. Id. Today, there exists no property right in a dead body. Id. at 453.
1111d.
112 Smith, supra note 52, at 852.
113BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 360 (5th ed. 1981).
'14THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 339 (1976).
1' Richards, Medical-Legal Problems of Organ Transplantation, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 77 (1970).
'"6Schwartz, supra note 43, at 417.
17 Schneck, Brain Death & Prolonged States of Impaired Responsiveness, 58 DEN. U. L. REv. 609, 622
(1981).
"$SRichards, supra note 115, at 102.
1191d.
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In light of these various definitions, 20 the Uniform Determination of Death
Act (UDDA) was adopted in Ohio and twenty-five other states including the
District of Columbia.' 21 By June, 1985, the remaining thirty-nine states had
passed legislation defining death.122 The UDDA states, "An individual who has
sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory func-
tions, or (2) irreversible cessations of all functions of the entire brain, including
the brain stem, is dead." 123 This definition has become known as "brain death." 
24
Coupled with this definition is the "Harvard Criteria"' 25 which outlines four
key elements physicians may use in ascertaining death:
1. Deep unconsciousness with no response to external stimuli or internal
need;
2. absence of movement and breathing;
3. lack of reflexes in the body; and,
4. flat or isoelectric electroencephalogram made twenty-four hours apart
serving as a useful and confirmatory evidence of death.'
26
Despite the advances states adopting the brain death definition have achieved,
complications arise under circumstances where the patient is placed on life
support 127 because brain death is not the only form of death which may occur.'
2 8
B. Stages of Death
The legal profession views death as something happening at an "instant"
120 1d.
121 Smith, supra note 52, at 854-55. See also Friloux, Death, When Does it Occur?, 27 BAYLOR L. REV.
10, 17 (1975).
122 Prottas, supra note 1, at 189.
123 Schwartz, supra note 43, at 418.
124 Smith, supra note 52.
125 Richards, supra note 115, at 102.
1261d.
127 A patient may be placed on life support due to natural causes or due to unfortunate circumstances.
In cases where a shooting has occurred, the death of the victim often results in litigation. For example,
in People v. Bonilla, 97 A.D.2d 396, 467 N.Y.S.2d 599 (1983), a shooting victim's kidneys were removed
after it was determined that the patient was in an irreversible coma. The issue arose as to whether the
defendant could escape a conviction of first degree murder because of the physicians' decision to terminate
life support. The court held that the bullet wound was the proximate cause of death and that the defendant
was properly convicted. Bonilla, 97 A.D.2d at 409, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 608. See, e.g., Strachan v. John F.
Kennedy Memorial Hosp., 209 N.J. Super. 300, 507 A.2d 718, where a shooting victim was maintained
on life support for days because the hospital did not have the proper consent forms authorizing termina-
tion available for his parents to sign; New York City Health & Hosp. Corp. v. Sulsona, 81 Misc. 2d 1002,
367 N.Y.S.2d 686 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975), where a shooting victim's organs were not removed in time due
to a controversy over the legal definition of death; State v. Long, 7 Ohio App. 3d 248, 455 N.E.2d 534
(1983), where the court determined that the last element of aggravated vehicular homicide did not occur
until brain death was declared. However, at least one jurisdiction has agreed with a defendant that remov-
ing life support systems was the sole cause of death. See Commonwealth v. Golston, 373 Mass. 249, 256,
366 N.E.2d 744, 749-50 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1039 (1978).
128 Smith, supra note 52.
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or "moment," 29 but the medical profession sees death as a continuing process, 30
where man dies in stages.' 3' Medical authorities agree that multiple kinds of
death occur at different stages in a progression from clinical to brain to biological
to cellular death. 32
Clinical, or cardiopulmonary death occurs when the vital functions of res-
piration and circulation cease. 33 The brain dies almost immediately following
clinical death because a fresh supply of oxygen is critical to its survival. 3 4 The
brain itself dies in stages 35 and may take hours, days, or weeks to complete
the process. 136 When all the brain's components have died, whole brain death
has occurred,' 37 and biological death may be declared. 38 Cellular death, the
final stage, occurs when artificial means are no longer employed to maintain
circulation and respiration, resulting in a slow deterioration of the body's tissue.,39
It is the gray area within whole brain death which has sparked concern
among the medical profession. 40 Because the brain dies in stages, it is possi-
ble for its higher functions to die while the brain stem survives.' 4' Although
the cortex may be dead, launching the patient into a state of irreversible un-
consciousness, the brain stem will continue to control the vital functions of
respiration, blood pressure and temperature. 42 This type of death is termed
"neocortical death"' 143 and it presents a legal, medical and ethical dilemma.' 44
This dilemma arises in part from the peculiar characteristics of neocortical
death. 45 The patient is essentially in a vegetative state when only the brain
129Friloux. supra note 121. at 10.
130/,/.
'31 Hirsch, Brain Death, 1975 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 377, 378.
132 d. See also Friloux, supra note 121, at 11.
133Hirsch, sit,,ra note 131. See also Smith, supra note 52.
134 Without a , .sh supply of oxygen, the brain cannot survive beyond six to ten minutes. Hirsch, supra
note 131.
1351d. at 379.
136 How quickly the brain dies depends upon a number of factors which include age, physiology, constitu-
tion, and environment. Id.
137Smith, supra note 52.
138Hirsch, supra note 131, at 379.
1391d.
140 Smith, supra note 52, at 875.
14 1Id. at 857.
12 1d.
143 d. at 851.
144 1d. at 875. Presently, physicians are unable to diagnose with one-hundred percent certainty the absence
of consciousness and cognition, but they are able to diagnose a state of irreversible unconsciousness. Id.
at 878-79. Such a diagnosis is performed by positron emission tomography (PET) which allows physicians
to accurately determine neocortical death. Id. at 879. The scan, which measures metabolic brain function,
costs approximately $1000, but is nominal compared to the average cost of $10,000 per month to maintain
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stem survives, but his body can remain biologically alive as long as intravenous
feeding, antibiotics, and a respirator are maintained.
46
Many experts believe that neocortical death should be treated in the same
fashion as whole brain death since they claim what really survives is a "mindless
organism."'' 47 However, since neocortical death is not legally recognized, the
fate of patients sustained on life support equipment 48 becomes entangled with
clinical parameters 49 and legal definitions of death.5 0 The dilemma has
originated a widespread belief that the medical profession routinely practices
passive euthanasia.' 5 ' Meanwhile, as doctors, lawyers and the courts battle over
who has the last word, 52 families of the unfortunate "victim" could face costs
as high as $10,000 per month to sustain a dying relative who has no real hope
of recovery.5 3 Moreover, the interpersonal and emotional considerations in
borderline cases weighs heavily upon the profession as a whole. 54 Although
almost ninety percent of physicians feel comfortable with the brain death con-
cept,'55 they still express fears about their legal liability in declaring death in
organ procurement matters.' 56
In answer to this problem, in 1986, the American Medical Association Coun-
cil on Ethical and Judicial Affairs (AMA) determined that doctors can withhold
or withdraw artificial feeding from terminally ill patients. 57 However, legal
1461d. See Part IV of this comment for a more detailed discussion of biomorts.
14 71d. at 858.
"'
4 In one case, an eighty-three year old patient was sustained on a respirator for 114 days beyond his fami-
ly's request to terminate treatment. Although the patient died during the court proceedings ordering his
treatment terminated, the family incurred expenses of $87,000 in medical bills and $20,000 in reduced
legal fees. Schneck, supra note 117. Similarly, in Leach v. Akron General Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc.
1. 426 N.E.2d 809 (1980). a terminally-ill patient was sustained on life support equipment for a period
of over tour months at an approximate cost of $500 per day. However, orders authorizing termination may
be an indicator that courts agree that sustaining a person or infant in a vegetative state serves no purpose.
E.g., hI re P.V.W., 242 So.2d 1015 (La. 1982), the parents of a newborn, who was severely brain damaged
and dependent upon a respirator for survival, were authorized to remove life support; In re Torres, 357
N.W.2d 332 (1984) life support ordered terminated on a patient who was irreversibly unconscious; /i re
Dinnerstein. 6 Mass. App. Ct. 466, 380 N.E.2d 134 (1978), order not to resuscitate patient with Alzheimer's
disease in noncognitive vegetative state. For a more detailed look at this perplexing situation, see Smith,
supra note 52.
149The four clinical parameters used to determine death are: (I) pupillary light reflex; (2) corneal blink
reflex; (3) withdrawal movements of limbs; and. (4) verbalization of any type. Schneck, supra note 117,
at 623. When all four are present, seventy-four percent of patients have demonstrated good recovery, while
twenty-six percent were left severely disabled. Id. When none of these elements exist, ninety-six percent
of patients die, while the remaining four percent are severely disabled. Id.
'S°Smith. supra note 52, at 874.
I' Id. at 874-75. See also Brown & Truitt, Euthanasia and the Right to Die, 3 OHo N.U.L. REV. 615 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Brown]. Even when perpetrators are caught, they are treated with sympathy. Id. at 616.
1'5 Smith, supra note 52, at 622, 690.
"I3 1d. at 883. See also Schneck, supra note 117, at 623.
'
5 4 Prottas. supra note I. at 191.
' d. at 189.
156 1d. at 190.
'" Smith. supra note 52, at 876-77.
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and constitutional concerns over the patient's right to life continue to make the
application of the AMA's proclamation difficult at best. 58 It remains to be seen
whether adopting a neocortical death standard would alleviate the situation and
dispel physician's fears of legal liability for actively declaring terminally ill pa-
tients dead. 59 Until that time, the whole brain death standard must suffice as
the legal recognition of death.
III. TRANSPLANTS, DONORS AND THE ORGAN SHORTAGE
A. History
The notion of organ transplants is not new.' 60 In fact, the Egyptians per-
formed tissue transplants over 5000 years ago in an effort to reconstruct the
decaying noses of syphilis victims.' 6' Many centuries later, in the 1760's, un-
fortunate female servants had their teeth extracted for transplantation into the
mouths of "fine" ladies.' 62 By the late 1800's, skin transplants were performed,
63
but it was not until the turn of this century that techniques for actual vessel
and organ transplants developed. 64
In 1947, the first kidney transplant procedure was performed. 65 The kidney
was attached to a blood vessel in the patient's arm. 66 Although it helped the
patient recover from severe kidney failure, it was rejected several days later. 67
The first truly successful kidney transplant occurred in 1954 between identical
twins. 68 By 1959, the discovery of immune suppressing drugs increased
transplant success rates because physicians were able to control organ rejec-
tion in patients. 69 In 1967, the first successful heart transplant was achieved
70
and now, everything from the cornea to the liver may be transplanted.'
7
'
B. Donors and the Transplant Process
Perhaps the most limiting factor to any organ transplant is finding a suitable
donor. 72 Of the estimated 22,000 potential organ donors nationwide, statistics
158 d. at 859.
159 1d. at 874. 883.




164 1n 1908. Dr. Charles C. Gutherie transplanted a dog's head from one dog to another. Id.
i6s id. at 68-69.
166 1d. at 69.
167 Id.
168 Id.
1691d. Today, Cyclosporine A helps fight rejection better than any other drug available, while reducing
the patient's intake of other drugs. Schwartz, supra note 43, at 399.
170Richards, supra note 115, at 87.
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show that only 4,000 actually become donors.173 As a result, one out of every
three patients waiting for a donor organ dies. 74 The United States operates the
largest organ procurement effort in the world, 75 but in 1986, only 7000 kidneys
were received from cadavers while 10,000 persons remained on a waiting list. 76
As early as 1968, a Gallup Poll disclosed that up to seventy percent of all
Americans were willing to donate organs 77 and although that figure has re-
mained substantially unchanged today,17 8 the organ shortage persists. It has been
attributed to everything from individual morals' 79 to a lack of active involve-
ment in the donation process. 80
Ohio has hoped to remedy at least a portion of this problem with the re-
cent enactment of its required request law.'8 ' Ron Ehrle, R.N. is the Organ
Procurement Coordinator for LifeBanc 82 and is based at Akron City Hospital.
He, like others involved in the coordination of transplants,'83 believes that the
new law will help to increase the short supply of organs.' 84 Of those families
he has approached since the new law became effective,' 85 between eighty and
eighty-five percent felt that organ donation had been a positive experience, and
that it helped to ease their grief.'86
Nurse Ehrle explains that a typical kidney transplant procedure lasts ap-
proximately thirty hours from inception to completion .87 Once a suitable
donor 8 8 is available, permission to remove the deceased's organs must be ob-
173Akron Beacon Journal. supra note 91.
1741,I.
17152 Fed. Reg. 28,666 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. Part 405, Subpart U).
176 d. Today. over 120 OPAs are in operation in the United States. Lee, supra note 3, at 384-85. These
agencies may be either hospital based or independent, and all are nonprofit and entirely federally funded.
ld.
177Bazil. supra note 62. Studies show that the number of donations between family members is on the
rise. and that primary donors are "female, highly educated, wealthy and white." Lee, supra note 3, at 368.
17 ld. at 367.
179 Petty & Heck, Lfe From Death - The Ultimate Goal of Transplantation, 27 NYL. SCH. L. REv. 1207,
1213 (1982) lhereinafter cited as Pettyl.
ISOLee, supra note 3.
1'8OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2108 (Baldwin 1969 & Supp. 1986).
182 For more information about donating organs in Ohio, contact LifeBanc at 1-800-558-LIFE, or locally
at 375-3299.
183Akron Beacon Journal. supra note 91.
184 lnterview with Ron Ehrle, R.N., Organ Procurement Coordinator for LifeBanc, Akron, Ohio (Jan.
15. 1988).
185See supra note 92.
186Ehrle interview, supra note 184. See also Petty, note 179, at 1219.
187Ehrle interview, supra note 184.
'
88 Persons dying of systemic infection involving the kidney, cancer, or a transmittable disorder are not
considered suitable donors. Richards, supra note 115, at 79.
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tained. 89 Although kidneys are removed most frequently,190 skin and other organs
are also considered for transplant.' 9' Once the organs are removed, they are
tissue and blood typed. 92 This information is analyzed against a listing of possi-
ble recipients who have already undergone the necessary typing tests. 93 Using
a numbering system which coordinates a multitude of typing factors, a donor
organ and donee with the closest match will be paired. 94 If two or more in-
dividuals qualify as potential recipients, the more critically ill patient will receive
the organ. t95 Akron City Hospital performs kidney transplants, 96 and although
it is not a formal member of the Ohio Solid Organ Transplant Consortium,' 97
it offers its services regionally, making organs available for needy patients in
other cities when a local match cannot be found. 198
C. Organ Sources
The human cadaver is the major supply source for organ transplants. 99
It provides over seventy percent of all available kidneys for transplant?00 Fresh
organs have been credited with improving success rates in patient transplants20'
and, the ideal donor has been described as "[a] young person who dies as a
result of a brain tumor, an accident, or in the course of cardiac surgery. 20 2
For obvious reasons, persons dying of systemic infection involving the kidney,
cancer, or a transmittable disorder are not considered suitable donors. 20 3
Another source of transplantable organs is the live donor.204 Live donors
may offer tissue, blood, plasma and other bodily fluids for donation in most
states, including Ohio2 s Live organ donors are typically those individuals who
189 Neither the donor's family nor his estate incur costs for the surgical procedures involved in removing
the organs. Also, pursuant to Ohio Revised Code Section 2108.07(B), the physician determining death does
not participate in the removal of organs or the transplant procedure. Ehrle interview, supra note 184.
190See Appendices C and D for statistics.










197 The Ohio Solid Organ Transplant Consortium is comprised of The Cleveland Clinic Foundation, Univer-
sity Hospitals, The University of Cincinnati Medical Center, and Ohio State University Hospitals. Ehrle
interview, supra note 184.
'"Ifa match cannot be found locally, other hospitals within the consortium are contacted first, then regional
hospitals, and finally, a national network is offered the organ. Ehrle interview, supra note 184.
99 Note, Consent and Organ Donation, 11 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 559, 559-60 (1985).
20°Schwartz, supra note 43, at 399.
201 Hirsch, supra note 131, at 382.
22Richards, supra note 115, at 79.
2031d.
2041d. at 78.
20SPetty, supra note 179, at 1210. 15
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have decided to donate a kidney to a dying relative 0 6 The majority of donors
are happy to see the organ recipient improve 0 7 However, in some instances,
relatives apply extraordinary pressure on an individual to donate an organ to
a dying relative when no suitable donor match can be found.208 For that reason,
donors are psychologically tested to determine whether they will be able to
withstand the stress of the transplant operation and the treatment which follows.209
Pressures to donate also appear in situations where the individual may not be
of age or mentally competent.210 The preference of a minor or incompetent has
been rationalized into a "substituted judgment" theory and is predicated upon
what the person would do if he were of age or competent.2 l'
The final sources of organs are artificial organs and animals donors l2 The
immediate problem with artificial organs is that many are not available,2 13 and
those which are must be tested before they can be transplanted. 21 4 Even im-
plants like the Jarvik-7 have met with only limited success.' 5 Xenografts, or
"donors of other species," 2 16 have been only nominally successful.2' 7 For ex-
ample, a baboon heart was transplanted into a human patient to assist a failing
heart, but the patient died.218 Similarly, when a chimpanzee heart was
206There is much suspicion concerning live, unrelated donors because of the motives involved in such
a donation. Schwartz, supra note 43, at 429.




9 1d. at 1207; Ehrle interview, supra note 184.
21
°See generally Baron, Medicine and Human Rights: Emerging Substantive Standards and Procedural
Protections for Medical Decision Making Within the American Family, 17 FAM. L.Q. 1 (1983).
211In Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1959), the court permitted an incompetent to undergo transplant
surgery which required the removal of his kidney. The kidney was to be transplanted in his ailing brother.
The court held that the doctrine of "substituted judgment" applied in this case. Id. at 148. The court based
its reasoning on the benefit the incompetent would receive in helping his brother, determining that the
donor would have made the same decision if he were competent. Id. at 146. Similarly, in Little v. Little,
576 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979), a girl with Down's Syndrome was permitted to donate a kidney
to her brother based upon the benefit theory. The benefit theory has also been used in the case of healthy
minor siblings; in Hart v. Brown, 29 Conn. Supp. 368, 289 A.2d 386 (Super. Ct. 1972), two eight-year-
old identical twin girls were permitted to undergo a kidney donation-transplant procedure. In contrast,
in Lausier v. Pescinski, 67 Wis. 2d 4, 226 N.W.2d 180 (1975), the court emphasized the importance of
receiving the donor's consent and denied the transplant of a kidney from a thirty-nine-year-old schizophrenic
man to his thirty-eight-year-old sister stating that the man would receive no benefit. See also In re Richardson,
284 So. 2d 185 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 284 So. 2d 338 (La. 1973), where the court denied a retarded
seventeen-year-old boy to donate a kidney to his thirty-two-year-old sister. For further information on
the substituted judgment and benefit theory, see also Note, Constitutional Law: Substantive Due Process
and the Incompetent Organ Donor, 33 OKLA. L. REV. 126 (1980). For a thorough discussion of the prob-
lems surrounding medical decisions for incompetents and minors see Baron, supra note 210.
212Schwartz, supra note 43, at 425.
21 Richards, supra note 115, at 78.
214 Id. at 79.
213Martyn, Using the Brain Dead for Medical Research, 1986 UTAH L. REv. 1, 2.
216Schwartz, supra note 43, at 430.
2171d. at 430-31.
2181d. at 430.
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transplanted into a human, the patient died three days after the operation.219
Many surgeons have abandoned xenografts because of the limited success of
these operations and the ethics encircling them.220 For example, Dr. Thomas
E. Strazl has abandoned such procedures:
[I]n a very serious emergency situation at one time, [I] did a chimpanzee
heterograft to a child whose first human liver had failed, so we were real-
ly up against a wall. We got from the Air Force a chimpanzee that was
three or four years old, and the chimpanzee was brought to Denver in a
cage and was brought over to my house and had tea. It actually was able
to have tea. When it was finished it made some human gestures and so
forth. It was so human, it was uncanny. I was really uneasy about taking
that little chimpanzee's liver. I would never do it again. It's too close to
being human.22'
Dr. John Najarian, the surgeon who transplanted a baboon heart into Baby
Fae, stated, "I think that this xenograft is premature because I am not aware
of any finding in the clinical literature that suggests anything but this prevail-
ing rule - the human body will reject a transplanted animal organ." 222 Although
artificial and animal organs can, and sometimes do act as a source of organs,
at this stage, they cannot effectively substitute for human organs.
Unfortunately, even those transplants involving human organs are not
without pitfalls. In general, the problems with these transplants are three-fold:
(1) organs have a very short "shelf-life"; 223 (2) despite public opinion polls,
people are reluctant to donate; 224 and (3) transplants can be financially and
emotionally costly.2 2 5
D. Other Obstacles
Aside from the obvious problem of locating "fresh" organs is the fact that
they do not remain fresh for very long.226 Unlike blood, solid organs cannot
be "banked" and stored for extended periods of time.227 Kidneys must be
transplanted within forty-eight hours; the liver within twelve hours; and the




22 21d. at 430.
223 Ehrle interview, supra note 184.
224 Bazil, supra note 62.
225Bill Lives On, supra note 92.
226Ehrle interview, supra note 184. The critical temperature for most tissues is in the 25*C. (770F.) to
150C. (59*F.)range. Wasmuth, The Concept of Death, 30 OHIO ST. L.J. 32, 35 (1969). Some tissues, like
the skin and cornea, can be stored at temperatures of around 4°C., but corneas must be transplanted as
soon as possible, while the skin may survive up to three weeks. Id.
227 Schwartz, supra note 43, at 399.
228 Ehrie interview, supra note 184.
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to remove an organ,229 an experienced surgeon should perform the operation
to ensure that the organ and its delicate vessels are not damaged. 230 Although
an organ's rapid deterioration is a problem, it appears small in comparison to
the ethical considerations involved in organ donation and transplant decisions. 3'
While millions of Americans claim they are willing to donate their organs,
misconceptions and fear sometimes overpower an individual's will. 32 Among
these fears are: beliefs that the body will be mutilated; 233 the organs will be
sold; 23 4 medical care will be substandard if doctors know the patient is a
donor;235 the organs will be removed before death has occurred. 23 6 Above all
else is the simple fact that most people just don't want to think about death.2 37
Similarly, religious suppositions play a major role in influencing a family's deci-
sion to donate, regardless of whether a deceased or living donor is involved .238
In the case of a deceased loved one, donation competes with the family's ethical
considerations which might encompass a host of elements such as honoring
the deceased's wishes, fulfilling the deceased's commitments, protecting the
integrity of the corpse, and providing a fitting removal of the body from socie-
ty. 3 9 Ironically, and contrary to most people's knowledge, many major religions
view organ donation favorably.2
40
Another limiting factor in organ transplants is the cost involved 241 and many
organizations are tightening their purse strings? 42 As of October 1, 1987,
Medicare reimbursement for transplants will depend upon whether hospitals
performing the procedure have a required request policy in effect?243 As a result,
229 Schwartz, supra note 43, at 400.
23 0Ehrle interview, supra note 184.
23
'Bazil, supra note 62.
2 3 2 1d.
233 Id.
2 3 4 1d"
235 Lee, supra note 3, at 369. See also Schwartz, supra note 43, at 421.
236Bazil, supra note 62.
237Note, supra note 62.
238 Lee, supra note 3, at 369; Schwartz, supra note 43, at 428.
239Schwartz, supra note 43, at 422.
2 4Most Western religions have no problems with organ donation. Id. at 423. Protestants take a liberal
view stating that organ donation is "ethically acceptable, but that it may be morally mandated to prevent
wasting human bodies." Id. at 428. The Jewish faith allows donation to help another person only if "the
probability of saving the recipient's life is substantially greater than the risk to the donor's life or health."
Id. Finally, Catholic theologians set out a list of four criteria which must be met for donation: (1) "There
must be a serious need on the part of the recipient that cannot be fulfilled in any other way; (2) the func-
tional integrity of the human person may not be impaired, even though anatomical integrity may suffer;
(3) the risk taken by the donor as an act of charity must be proportionate to the good resulting for the
recipient; and (4) the donor's consent must be free and informed." Id.
241 See Appendix C.
242 This proposition is supported by the fact that group insurance plans, such as Blue Cross, provide guidelines
for usual and customary charges, and each year group participants are provided with policy supplements
detailing those services which are no longer covered through the plan.
243Bill Lives On, supra note 92.
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those critically ill persons in need of transplant surgery may never see their
name on a waiting list unless their insurance will pay the bill.244 The effect
of the government's failure to set reimbursement guidelines for transplants is
evident in the skyrocketing costs associated with this type of surgery.245 In 1972,
Congress agreed to pay 100 percent of the charge for kidney transplants through
the Medicare program. 246 Although the decision appeared to be cost-effective
on its face, the government did not anticipate the dramatic progress dialysis
and transplant techniques would realize.247 As a result, in 1982, Medicare costs
for renal disease treatments reached $1.8 billion 43
In the face of these outrageous medical bills, society must seriously ques-
tion whether government subsidies for organ transplants should continue when
the limited financial resources presently available might benefit a larger percen-
tage of the population if they were channeled into medical research in other
areas.249 However, the downside of removing government subsidies is no more
attractive. With individual transplant procedures costing anywhere from $4000
for a cornea to a hefty $238,000 for a kidney and subsequent medical treat-
ment,250 organ transplants may no longer depend as much upon a suitable tissue
match as they will upon a healthy wallet. Without government help, pricing
may push transplants into the realm of the affluent or those individuals for-
tunate enough to have insurance coverage.251
Despite the fact that legislatures across the nation have adopted laws defining
death,252 and have forced hospitals to ask for organs,253 there still remains a
troublesome shortage. Costs are soaring, and at least some individuals advocate
a new system to remedy the situation.
IV. THE FUTURE OF ORGAN PROCUREMENT
Today, between ten and twelve million Americans donate blood each year.254
However, even paid blood donation has been termed a service rather than a
sale.2 "5 While the UAGA remains silent on the issue,25 6 Congress has passed
a federal law prohibiting the sale of human organs, and most states have passed
similar legislation.2 7 Yet the fact remains that organs are scarce and as a result,
2 44 Schwartz, supra note 43, at 402.





249 Note, supra note 62, at 1209. See also Schwartz, supra note 43, at 402, 404.
25 See supra note 190.
251 Note, supra note 62, at 1206.
252Prottas, supra note 1, at 189-90.
253See generally Uniform Anatomical Gift Act 8A U.L.A. 16 (1986).
254Petty, supra note 179, at 1210.
215 See generally OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2108 (Baldwin 1969 & Supp. 1986).
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many persons who may have survived if an organ were available, have died.
This problem has led many commentators to propose a variety of methods for
increasing the supply, the foremost of which is organ sales.258 Although the
idea seems simple enough, it raises a host of legal, procedural, and ethical
problems. 259
A. Brokerage Sales
Apparently, some individuals have attempted to sell their organs, 260 despite
the laws which prohibit them from doing so.26 I H. Barry Jacobs, an entrepreneur,
made the first proposal for selling organs through a company that he planned
to operate much like a brokerage house. 262 Jacobs would receive an estimated
two to five-thousand dollars per transaction; the recipient would pay the charge.
2 6 3
Jacobs* proposal went as far to include third world countries and indigents in
his plans.264 He maintained that he would have no difficulty obtaining informed
consent from illiterate, poor persons worldwide because he would record their
verbal consent on tape. Jacobs referred to his plan as a "very lucrative, poten-
tial business." 265 Jacobs' proposal generated so much public outcry that the
federal government banned organ sales.2 66 Alternatives to a complete ban of
sales, such as an open market system, 67 have been suggested despite Congress'
decision.
B. The Open Market
It is believed that the open market approach to buying and selling organs
would increase the supply while eliminating doctor-patient-family frictions.268
The open market system is based upon the assumption that people will gladly
sell their organs or the organs of a deceased loved one. In reality, many people
may not be willing to do so. Those who may have considered selling might
believe that the demand has been met, while another group may feel that donated
parts are of a better quality than those which are sold.2 69 Furthermore, religious
beliefs will no doubt enter the decision making process.270 In addition, a dif-
25B See generally Schwartz, supra note 43; Note, supra note 256; Dukeminier, supra note 66.
259 Id.
260 Note, supra note 256 at 1012.
261 Lee. supra note 3. at 401.
262 Note, supra note 256, at 1021.
263h/"
• 64 f4
26 1d. at 1022.
266Id, at 1022-24.
267 See s.wprt note 258.
268 Note, supra note 62. at 1220.
269(. at 1224.
270 d. at 1193.
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ferent set of obstacles arise when the donor is living and the product is not
one that is self-replicating.2 7 t In any case, the idea is fraught with problems.272
The most prevalent problem anticipated is that the "poor and powerless"
would sell their body parts.273 Therefore, not all organs offered under an open
market system may be acceptable because the donor might be malnourished,
a drug user, diseased or otherwise unhealthy.274 While screening may detect
unsuitable donors, the profit to be made might encourage other unhealthy in-
dividuals to conceal medical records. 75 Another complication associated with
accepting organs from the poor is that taking the organ could subject the per-
son to great health risks after surgery is completed. 276 Ethical concerns are
heightened by the realization that the white upper class is likely to become the
major purchaser of these organs, while poor minorities are likely to become
the major donors.277
Furthermore, legitimate sales could increase the abortion rate.2 78 When
pregnant women, many of whom are single, struggling to pay the rent, and
caring for an already large family, have an option to end their pregnancy at
a profit, cash organ sales may present an all too attractive alternative.279 In ad-
dition, women not living under impoverished conditions may see a pregnancy-
abortion routine as a lucrative method of earning extra cash.280
In turn, this situation could easily produce a black market in organ pro-
curement, resulting in "unsavory trafficking," and even murder.28' Although
government controls and pricing could provide some safeguards for an open
market system,282 it is not unforeseeable that a monopoly in trade could result.2 83
A related problem is that body parts can only be valued by those with ex-
perience.2 84 Conscientious physicians participating in the valuation of organs
would have little incentive to price healthy organs inexpensively, while unethical
271 Id. at 1217. The crime of mayhem may could become a problem with organs because they are not self-
replicating. Id. at 1240. Mayhem is defined as, "the offense of willfully maiming or crippling a person,"
and has also been referred to as "willful, malicious and permanent disfigurement or disablement of the
body." Id.; THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 809 (1976).
272 Note, supra note 62, at 1217.
2731d. at 1225. See also Schwartz, supra note 43, at 407.
274 1d. at 1225.
275Jd.
276Schwartz, supra note 43, at 408.
277 Note, supra note 62, at 1217.
17 5Ehrle interview, supra note 184.
279 1d.
2 80The author merely expands upon the potentially negative aspects of paid organ sales.
281 The notion of selling organs raises the question of whether an individual's organs may used as col-
lateral for purchases and loans. Note, supra note 62, at 1218.
2821d. at 1225.
2 8 3 Id.
284 Ehrle interview, supra note 184.
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practitioners may extract organs from anyone interested in selling as long as
profit might be had. 28 5 This scenario is potentially endless.
While an argument may be made that government involvement in the system
would curb unsavory dealings, it would not necessarily guarantee an increase
in the supply of healthy organs, nor would it ensure the market's safe, fair and
efficient operation. 286
C. Alternatives to the Open Market System
The open market system involving live donors is not the only solution of-
fered to increase the nation's organ supply. Cadaver-only markets have been
suggested as a way to avoid coercion of live donors into selling their parts.28
7
However, there is no certainty that cadaver markets would prevent black market
operations from supplying cadavers.2 88
Remuneration other than cash given to the family of the deceased, and
even a trading system between live donors, has been suggested in an effort to
reduce the organ shortage.289 Likewise, presumed consent has been offered as
an alternative to sales.290
Under presumed consent, organ removal would be routine upon a patient's
death, unless the family or other responsible parties objected to the procedure. 9'
However, even if it were in effect, this theory may prove to be of very limited
value. For instance, in several areas of Europe, presumed consent is the law,
but families are usually asked for permission to remove organs because social
custom requires it.292 In that respect, social custom negates presumed consent.293
In addition, since it is believed that almost eighty percent of all families would
donate organs today, it is unlikely that presumed consent would have a substantial
impact in increasing the supply.294
Another suggestion is compulsory donation.295 Under this theory, everyone
285 Note. supra note 62, at 1229 mentions that physicians presently receive a multitude of literature pro-
duced by pharmaceutical companies which detail the benefits of a new drug to the patient, but seldom
disclose the drug's cost. Therefore cost does not become a motivating factor in his decision to prescribe
that drug.ld.
2 8 6hd. at 1231.
287 Note. supra note 269, at 1037.
288This result could occur with any product which is in short supply or illegal. For example, it is common
knowledge that organized crime is involved in supplying this country with illegal drugs, and organ sales
would merely present an opportunity for these organizations to diversify.
289 Note. supra note 265, at 1037. See also Lee, supra note 3, at 400.
29 0Prottas. supra note I, at 187.
2911d.
292 11.
293 ]d. at 188.
294 Id.
295 Lee, supra note 3, at 397.
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would be tissue and blood typed and placed on a national registry mandating
a donation of one kidney.296 However, it is unlikely that a program of this sort
would ever come into existence because of the constitutional issues it presents
in cases of both live and cadaver donations.297 In the alternative, compulsory
donation from convicts and fetuses has been proposed.2 98 A final alternative
is compulsory removal upon death, as opposed to presumed consent.299
D. Biomorts
Perhaps the most shocking vision of the future is the biomort. A biomort
is a person who has been declared brain dead, but whose body is kept alive
by means of life support systems.300 A biomort bears an uncanny resemblance
to a person who is merely sleeping because the body has respiration, a pulse,
color and even warmth.3 1 The difference is that the person is clinically dead.30 2
Biomorts have already been used to test drugs, uterine functions, and me-
chanical hearts.30 3 The potential for the biomort is unlimited because it is in
a state similar to that of an anesthetized patient.304 The advantage of the biomort's
state is that it can be used by medical students to learn surgical procedures,
by researchers to test drugs and equipment, and it is a stable, no-risk organism?05
Additionally, the results achieved from such experiments can be directly ap-
plied to live patients.30 6 It has been suggested that biomorts and their internal
organs could be catalogued and used as a ready supply of organs for transplant,
as well as a harvesting ground for blood, tissue, fluids, and hormones.30 7 Drugs
like interferon could also be produced from these human sources.308
As medically appealing as biomorts may be, serious ethical problems are
involved. Currently, there are no laws governing biomort research, and often
times, there are unsettling results.309 Medical students performing procedures
on biomorts have recorded "[d]ramatic increases in ... blood pressure as well






°Martyn, supra note 214, at 1-2.
01 Id. at 8.
302 Id.
30 3 Id. at 2, 7.
3 04 Id. at 8.
30 See generally id.
306 1d. at 5.
307 1d. at 6.
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capable of feeling pain despite the fact that the brain was dead. 10 In a documen-
tary film produced for British television, a team of American doctors was shown
preparing to remove an organ from a brain dead "cadaver" when the body moved
and breathed simultaneously; the surgeons completed the procedure.3"
Unfortunately, the UAGA does not address biomorts,'3 2 but it becomes clear
that legislation governing procedures of this nature should be enacted in the
interest of preserving the integrity of the body, as well as the piece of mind
of physicians and family.
Biomorts, brokerage houses, and open market sales of organs present some
fascinating concepts and sometimes sensational solutions to increase the organ
supply. While organ sales are not a complete impossibility, it is doubtful that
Congress or public opinion will change dramatically. However, perhaps the
most realistic suggestions to the sales alternative have been those which pro-
pose changes in existing legislation such as implementing required request laws
and strengthening the decedent's wishes through an absolute binding power of
donor cards.31 3 Making the public more aware of organ donation and its benefits
though medical and religious organizations may have the greatest impact of all.
V. CONCLUSION
The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act has served as the framework for organ
donation statutes nationwide.3 14 It has provided a model for uniformity under
a system that would be unworkable without it. Since its adoption in 1969, chang-
ing technology and unanticipated need have pointed to its shortcomings, but
the Act stands alone as the major catalyst for organ procurement. In Ohio and
other jurisdictions, it has helped thousands of families grapple with the tragic
loss of a loved one by providing them with the option of giving life through
death. While finding donors and transplanting organs quickly sometimes presents
problems, the most serious problem is the short supply of organs. Although
current medical technology could provide a warehouse of body parts,315 it is
unlikely that society's age old reverence for the dead will disappear in the near
future.
3101d. at 9.
3 11Id. at 13.
3 12See generally UAGA 8A U.L.A. (1986).
3 1 3 Prottas, supra note 1, at 401.
3 14 See UAGA supra note 35.
t31 Marytn, supra note 214, at 3.
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The answer to the shortage does not lie in merely enacting new legisla-
tion. Recognition of our mortality is something that our society as a whole
seems reluctant to acknowledge. The never-aging image of youth is projected
in our advertising and attitudes and often times, in the way we live. However,
as much as we try to disguise it, the stark reality remains - we are mortal.
That is not to suggest that we should refuse to enjoy life and dwell upon the
inevitable. But during those somber moments when we are confronted with
the death of a loved one and reminded of our mortality, we should face the
question of what to do with our own body upon its death. The reversal of the
organ shortage depends as much upon our individual efforts to confront this
question and make an informed decision, as it does upon proper legislation.
Changing attitudes about organ procurement through increased public awareness,
family support and religious approval may well be the solution to dramatically
increasing the number of those who are committed to give the gift of life.
JULIANA S. MOORE
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APPENDIX A
UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT AcT
§ 1. [Definitions]
(a) "Bank or storage facility" means a facility licensed, accredited, or ap-
proved under the laws of any state for storage of human bodies or parts thereof.
(b) "Decedent" means a deceased individual and includes a stillborn in-
fant or fetus.
(c) "Donor" means an individual who makes a gift of all or part of his body.
(d) "Hospital" means a hospital licensed, accredited, or approved under
the laws of any state; includes a hospital operated by the United States govern-
ment, a state, or a subdivision thereof, although not required to be licensed
under state laws.
(e) "Part" means organs, tissues, eyes, bones, arteries, blood, other fluids
and any other portions of a human body.
(f) "Person" means an individual, corporation, government or governmental
subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, trust, partnership or association,
or any other legal entity.
(g) "Physician" or "surgeon" means a physician or surgeon licensed or
authorized to practice under the laws of any state.
(h) "State" includes any state, district, commonwealth, territory, insular
possession, and any other area subject to the legislative authority of the United
States of America.
§ 2. [Persons Who May Execute an Anatomical Gift]
(a) Any individual of sound mind and 18 years of age or more may give
all or any part of his body for any purpose specified in section 3, the gift to
take effect upon death.
(b) Any of the following persons, in order of priority stated, when per-
sons in prior classes are not available at the time of death, and in the absence
of actual notice of contrary indications by the decedent or actual notice of op-
position by a member of the same or a prior class, may give all or any part
of the decedent's body for any purpose specified in section 3:
(1) the spouse,
(2) an adult son or daughter,
(3) either parent,
(4) an adult brother or sister,
(5) a guardian of the person of the decedent at the time of his death,
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(6) any other person authorized or under obligation to dispose of the body.
(c) If the donee has actual notice of contrary indications by the decedent
or that a gift by a member of a class is opposed by a member of the same or
a prior class, the donee shall not accept the gift. The persons authorized by
subsection (b) may make the gift after or immediately before death.
(d) A gift of all or part of a body authorizes any examination necessary
to assure medical acceptability of the gift for the purposes intended.
(e) The rights of the donee created by the gift are paramount to the rights
of others except as provided by Section 7(d).
§ 3. [Persons Who May Become Donees; Purposes for Which Anatomical
Gifts May be Made]
The following persons may become donees of gifts of bodies or parts thereof
for the purposes stated:
(1) any hospital, surgeon, or physician, for medical or dental education,
research, advancement of medical or dental science, therapy, or
transplantation; or
(2) any accredited medical or dental school, college or university for educa-
tion, research, advancement of medical or dental science, or therapy; or
(3) any bank or storage facility, for medical or dental education, research,
advancement of medical or dental science, therapy, or transplantation; or
(4) any specified individual for therapy or transplantation needed by him.
§ 4. [Manner of Executing Anatomical Gifts]
(a) A gift of all or part of the body under Section 2(a) may be made by
will. The gift becomes effective upon the death of the testator without waiting
for probate. If the will is not probated, or if it is declared invalid for testame0-
tary purposes, the gift, to the extent that it has been acted upon in good faith,
is nevertheless valid and effective.
(b) A gift of all or part of the body under Section 2(a) may also be made
by document other than a will. The gift becomes effective upon the death of
the donor. The document, which may be a card designed to be carried on the
person, must be signed by the donor [in the presence of 2 witnesses who must
sign the document in his presence]. If the donor cannot sign, the document
may be signed for him at his direction and in his presence in the presence of
2 witnesses who must sign the document in his presence. Delivery of the docu-
ment of gift during the donor's lifetime is not necessary to make the gift valid.
(c) The gift may be made to a specified donee or without specifying a
donee. If the latter, the gift may be accepted by the attending physician as donee
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upon or following death. If the gift is made to a specified donee who is not
available at the time and place of death, the attending physician upon or following
death, in the absence of any expressed indication that the donor desired other-
wise, may accept the gift as donee. The physician who becomes a donee under
this subsection shall not participate in the procedures for removing or trans-
planting a part.
(d) Notwithstanding Section 7(b), the donor may designate in his will,
card, or other document of gift the surgeon or physician to carry out the ap-
propriate procedures. In the absence of a designation or if the designee is not
available, the donee or other person authorized to accept the gift may employ
or authorize any surgeon or physician for the purpose.
(e) Any gift by a person designated in Section 2(b) shall be made by a
document signed by him or made by his telegraphic, recorded telephonic, or
other recorded message.
§ 5. [Delivery of Document of Gift]
If the gift is made by the donor to a specified donee, the will, card, or
other document, or an executed copy thereof, may be delivered to the donee
to expedite the appropriate procedures immediately after death. Delivery is not
necessary to the validity of the gift. The will, card, or other document, or an
executed copy thereof, may be deposited in any hospital, bank or storage facility
or registry office that accepts it for safekeeping or for facilitation of procedures
after death. On request of any interested party upon or after the donor's death,
the person in possession shall produce the document for examination.
§ 6. [Amendment or Revocation of the Gift]
(a) If the will, card, or other document or executed copy thereof, has been
delivered to a specified donee, the donor may amend or revoke the gift by:
(1) the execution and delivery to the donee of a signed statement, or
(2) an oral statement made in the presence of 2 persons and communicated
to the donee, or
(3) a statement during a terminal illness or injury addressed to an atten-
ding physician and communicated to the donee, or
(4) a signed card or document found on his person or in his effects.
(b) Any document of gift which has not been delivered to the donee may
be revoked by the donor in the manner set out in subsection (a), or by destruc-
tion, cancellation, or mutilation of the document and all executed copies thereof.
(c) Any gift made by a will may also be amended or revoked in the man-
ner provided for amendment or revocation of wills, or as provided in subsec-
tion (a).
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§ 7. [Rights and Duties at Death]
(a) The donee may accept or reject the gift. If the donee accepts a gift
of the entire body, he may, subject to the terms of the gift, authorize embalm-
ing and the use of the body in funeral services. If the gift is of a part of the
body, the donee, upon the death of the donor and prior to embalming, shall
cause the part to be removed without unnecessary mutilation. After removal
of the part, custody of the remainder of the body vests in the surviving spouse,
next of kin, or other persons under obligation to dispose of the body.
(b) The time of death shall be determined by a physician who tends the
donor at his death, or, if none, the physician who certifies the death. The physi-
cian shall not participate in the procedures for removing or transplanting a part.
(c) A person who acts in good faith in accord with the terms of this Act
or with the anatomical gift laws of another state [or a foreign country] is not
liable for damages in any civil action or subject to prosecution in any criminal
proceeding for his act.
(d) The provisions of this Act are subject to the laws of this state prescrib-
ing powers and duties with respect to autopsies.
§ 8. [Uniformity of Interpretation]
This Act shall be so construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make
uniform the law of those states which enact it.
§ 9. [Short Title]
This Act may be cited as the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act.
§ 10. [Repeal]




§ 11. [Time of Taking Effect]
This Act shall take effect . . ..
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CHAPTER 2108: HUMAN BODIES OR PARTS THEREOF
§ 2108.01 [Definitions.]
As used in sections 2108.01 to 2108.10, inclusive, of the Revised Code:
(A) "Bank or storage facility" means a facility licensed, accredited, or
approved under the laws of any state for storage of human bodies or parts thereof.
(B) "Decedent" means a deceased individual and includes a stillborn in-
fant or fetus.
(C) "Donor" means an individual who makes a gift of all or part of his
body.
(D) "Hospital" means any hospital operated in this state which is accredited
by the joint commission on accreditation of hospitals of the American hospital
association, the American medical association, the American college of physi-
cians. and the American college of surgeons. "Hospital" also means a hospital
licensed, accredited, registered, or approved under the laws of any state, and
includes a hospital operated by the United States government, a state, or a sub-
division thereof, although not required to be licensed under state laws.
(E) "Part" means organs, tissues, eyes, bones, arteries, blood or other
fluids, and any other portions of a human body.
(F) "Person" means an individual, corporation, government or govern-
mental subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, trust, partnership or associa-
tion, or any other legal entity.
(G) "Physician" or "surgeon" means a physician or surgeon licensed or
authorized to practice under the laws of any state.
(H) "State" means any state, district, commonwealth, territory, insular
possession, and any other area subject to the legislative authority of the United
States of America.
HISTORY: 133 v H 51 (Eff 11-6-69); 133 v H 852. Eff 8-27-70.
§ 2108.02 [Rights of donor; donee.]
(A) Any individual of sound mind and eighteen years of age or more may
give all or any part of his body for any purpose specified in section 2108.03
of the Revised Code, the gift to take effect upon his death.
(B) Any of the following persons, in the order of priority stated, when
persons in prior classes are not available at the time of death, and in the absence
of actual notice of contrary indications by the decedent or actual notice of op-
position by a member of the same or a prior class, may give any part of the
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decedent's body for any purpose specified in section 2108.03 of the Revised Code:
(1) The spouse;
(2) An adult son or daughter:
(3) Either parent;
(4) An adult brother or sister;
(5) A guardian of the person of the decedent at the time of his death;
(6) Any other person authorized or under obligation to dispose of the body.
(C) The donee shall not accept the gift if he has actual notice of contrary
indications by the decedent or that a gift by a member of a class is opposed
by a member of the same or a prior class. The persons authorized in division
(B) of this section may make the gift after or immediately before death.
(D) A gift of all or part of a body authorizes any examination necessary
to assure medical acceptability of the gift for the purpose intended.
(E) The rights of the donee created by the gift are paramount to the rights
of others except that a coroner, or in his absence, a deputy coroner, who has,
under section 313.13 of the Revised Code, taken charge of the decedent's dead
body and decided that an autopsy is necessary, has a right to the dead body
and any part that is paramount to the rights of the donee. The coroner, or in
his absence, the deputy coroner, may waive this paramount right and permit
the donee to take a donated part if the donated part is or will be unnecessary
for successful completion of the autopsy or for evidence. If the coroner or deputy
coroner does not waive his paramount right and later determines, while per-
forming the autopsy, that the donated part is or will be unnecessary for suc-
cessful completion of the autopsy or for evidence, he may thereupon waive his
paramount right and permit the donee to take the donated part, either during
the autopsy or after it is completed.
HISTORY: 133 v H 51 (Eff 11-6-69); 136 v H 1182. Eff 5-4-76.
[§ 2108.02.1] § 2108.021 [Hospital to develop procurement protocol; request
for gift; guidelines.]
(A) As used in this section, "Certified organ and tissue procurement
organization" means a non-profit organ or tissue procurement organization that
has its principal place of business in this state and is certified under Title XVIII
of the "Social Security Act," 49 Stat. 620 (1935), 42 U.S.C. 301, as amended,
or by the eye bank association of America.
(B) Every hospital shall develop an organ and tissue procurement protocol
in consultation with a certified organ and tissue procurement organization. The
protocol shall encourage reasonable discretion and sensitivity to the family cir-
cumstances in all discussions regarding donations of tissue or organs. The pro-
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tocol shall identify the appropriate circumstances under which a request for
organ or tissue donations is made or not made and shall require that families
of potential organ donors be informed of the option to donate tissue or organs.
Such notification shall be the responsibility of the certified organ and tissue
procurement organization unless otherwise designated. In any case in which
a hospital patient is suitable as an organ or tissue donor based on the hospital's
protocol, the certified organ and tissue procurement organization, the hospital
administrator, or his designated representative shall request one or more of the
persons described in division (B) of section 2108.02 of the Revised Code to
make a gift of appropriate parts of the patient's body, except that the certified
organ and tissue procurement organization, the hospital administrator, or his
designated representative shall not make such a request if he has actual notice
of contrary intentions by the patient, actual notice of opposition by any of the
persons described in division (B) of section 2108.02 of the Revised Code, or
reason to believe that a gift for purposes described in section 2108.03 of the
Revised Code is contrary to the patient's religious beliefs.
When a gift is requested under this section, the certified procurement
organization, the hospital administrator, or his designated representative shall
complete a certificate of request for an anatomical gift, on a form prescribed
by the director of health. The certificate shall state whether or not a request
for an anatomical gift was made, shall state the name of the person or persons
to whom the request was made and his or their relationship to the patient, and
shall state whether or not the gift was granted. Upon completion of the cer-
tificate, the certified organ and tissue procurement organization, the hospital
administrator, or his designated representative shall retain the certificate in a
central location for no less than three years after the date of the patient's death.
Upon the request of the director of health, the certified organ and tissue organiza-
tion, hospital administrator, or his designated representative shall permit the
director or his authorized representative to inspect or copy the certificate or
shall provide a summary of the information contained in the certificates to the
director on a form prescribed by the director. All copies of such certificates
or summaries in the possession of the director, except for any patient-identifying
information contained in them, are public records as defined in section 149.43
of the Revised Code.
(C) The director of health shall issue guidelines establishing:
(1) Recommendations for the training of persons representing certified organ
and tissue procurement organizations, hospital administrators, and
representatives designated to make requests for anatomical gifts under
this section;
(2) Communication and coordination procedures to improve the efficien-
cy of making donated organs available. The guidelines shall include
procedures for communicating with the appropriate certified organ and
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tissue procurement organization.
HIsTORY: 141 V H 770. Eff 3-17-87.
The effective date provisions of HB 770 are set by § 3 of the act.
§ 2108.03 [Who may become donees.]
Any of the following persons may become donees of gifts of bodies or parts
thereof for the purposes stated;
(A) A hospital, surgeon, or physician, for medical or dental education,
research, advancement of medical or dental science, therapy, or transplantation.
(B) An accredited medical or dental school, college, or university, for
education, research, advancement of medical or dental science, or therapy;
(C) A bank or storage facility, for medical or dental education, research,
advancement of medical or dental science, therapy, or transplantation;
(D) A specified individual for therapy or transplantation needed by him.
HISTORY: 133 v H 51. Eff 11-6-69.
§ 2108.04 [Gift made effective upon death.]
(A) A gift of all or part of the body under division (A) of section 2108.02
of the Revised Code may be made by will. The gift becomes effective upon
the death of the testator without waiting for probate. If the will is not probated
or if it is declared invalid for testatmentary purposes, the gift, to the extent
that it has been acted upon in good faith, is nevertheless valid and effective.
(B) A gift of all or part of the body under division (A) of section 2108.02
of the Revised Code may also be made by any document other than a will.
The gift becomes effective upon the death of the donor. The document, which
may be a card designed to be carried on the person, shall be signed by the
donor in the presence of two witnesses who shall sign the document in his
presence. If the donor cannot sign, the document may be signed for him at
his direction and in the presence of two witnesses, having no affiliation with
the donee, who shall sign the document in his presence. Delivery of the docu-
ment of gift during the donor's lifetime is not necessary to make the gift valid.
(C) A gift of parts of the body under division (A) of section 2108.02 of
the Revised Code, may also be made by a statement to be provided for on all
Ohio operator's or chauffeur's licenses or motorcycle operator's licenses, or
endorsements, and on all identification cards. The gift becomes effective upon
the death of the donor. The statement must be signed by the holder of the
operator's or chauffeur's license or endorsement, or by the holder of the iden-
tification card, in the presence of two witnesses, who must sign the statement
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in the presence of the donor. Delivery of the license or identification card dur-
ing the donor's lifetime is not necessary to make the gift valid. The gift shall
become invalidated upon expiration or cancellation of the license or endorse-
ment, or identification card. Revocation or suspension of the license or en-
dorsement will not invalidate the gift. The gift must be renewed upon renewal
of each license, endorsement, or identification card. If the statement is am-
biguous as to whether a general or specific gift is intended by the donor, the
statement shall be construed as evidencing the specific gift only. As used in
this division, "identification card" means an identification card issued under
section 4507.50 of the Revised Code.
(D) The gift may be made to a specified donee or without specifying a
donee. If the latter, the gift may be accepted by the attending physician as donee
upon or following death. If the gift is made to a specified donee who is not
available at the time and place of death, the attending physician may accept
the gift as donee upon or following death, in the absence of any expressed in-
dication that the donor desired otherwise. The physician who accepts the gift
as donee under this division shall not participate in the procedures for remov-
ing or transplating a part.
(E) Notwithstanding division (B) of section 2108.07 of the Revised Code,
the donor may designate in his will, card, or other document of gift the surgeon
or physician to carry out the appropriate procedures. In the absence of a designa-
tion or if the designee is not available, the donee or other person authorized
to accept the gift may employ or authorize any surgeon or physician to carry
out the appropriate procedures.
(F) Any gift by a person specified in division (B) of section 2108.02 of
the Revised Code shall be made by a document signed by him or made by his
telegraphic, recorded telephonic, or other recorded message.
*HIsToRY: 137 v S294 (Eff 6-2-78); 140 v S302. Eff 10-1-84.
§ 2108.05 [Safekeeping of document.]
If the gift is made by the donor to a specified donee, the will, card, or
other document, or an executed copy thereof, may be delivered to the donee
to expedite the appropriate procedures immediately after death. Delivery is not
necessary to the validity of the gift. The will, card, or other document, or an
executed copy thereof, may be deposited in any hospital, bank or storage facility,
or registry office that accepts it for safekeeping or for facilitation of procedures
after death. On request of any interested party upon or after the donor's death,
the person in possession shall produce the document for examination.
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HISTORY: 133 v H 51. Eff 11-6-69.
§ 2108.06 [Gift revocation.]
(A) If the will, card, or other document, or an executed copy thereof, has
been delivered to a specified donee, the donor may amend or revoke the gift
by any of the following means:
(1) The execution and delivery to the donee of a signed statement;
(2) An oral statement made in the presence of two persons and com-
municated to the donee;
(3) A statement during a terminal illness or injury addressed to an attend-
ing physician and communicated to the donee;
(4) A signed card or document found on his person or in his effects.
(B) The donor may revoke any document of gift which has not been
delivered to the donee, in any manner specified in division (A) of this section
or by destruction, cancellation, or mutilation of the document and all executed
copies thereof.
(C) Any gift made by a will may also be amended or revoked in the man-
ner provided for amendment or revocation of wills or as provided in division
(A) of this section.
HISTORY: 133 v H 51. Eff 11-6-69.
§ 2108.07 [Removal of part; transplant restrictions.]
(A) The donee may accept or reject the gift. If the donee accepts a gift
of the entire body, the surviving spouse or next of kin may, subject to the terms
of the gift, authorize embalming and the use of the body in funeral services.
If the gift is of a part of the body, the donee, upon the death of the donor and
prior to embalming, shall cause the part to be removed without unnecessary
mutilation. After removal of the part, custody of the remainder of the body
vests in the surviving spouse, next of kin, or other persons under obligation
to dispose of the body.
(B) The attending physician or a physician selected by the donor shall deter-
mine the time of death. If it is not possible for such physician to attend the
donor at his death or to certify the death within a period of time which would
make it possible to carry out the terms of the gift, the time of death shall be
determined by two physicians having no affiliation with the donee. The physi-
cian or physicians determining the time of death or certifying the death shall
not participate in the procedures for removing or transplanting a part.
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HISTORY: 133 V H 51. Eff 11-6-69.
[§ 2108.07.11 § 2108.071 Eye enucleation by embalmer.
(A) With respect to the gift of an eye, an embalmer licensed pursuant to
Chapter 4717. of the Revised Code who has completed a course in eye enuclea-
tion and has received a certificate of competency to that effect from a school
of medicine recognized by the state medical board may enucleate eyes for the
gift after proper certification of death by a physician and compliance with the
intent of the gift as defined by sections 2108.01 to 2108.10 of the Revised Code.
(B) As used in this section, "eye enucleation" means the removal of the
eyeball in such a way that it comes out clean and whole.
HISTORY: 135 v H 12-42. Eff 3-4-75.
§ 2108.08 [Liability for damages.]
A person who acts in good faith in accordance with sections 2108.01 to
2108.10, inclusive, of the Revised Code, or the anatomical gift laws of another
state, is not liable for damages in any civil action or subject to prosecution
in any criminal proceeding for his act.
HISTORY: 133 V H 51 (Eff 11-6-69); 133 v H 852. Eff 8-27-70.
§ 2108.09 [Uniform act.]
Sections 2108.01 to 2108.09, inclusive, of the Revised Code, are enacted
to adopt the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (1968), national conference of com-
missioners on uniform state laws, and shall be construed so as to effectuate
its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it.
HISTORY: 133 v H 51. Eff 11-6-69.
§ 2108.10 Forms.
(A) The document of gift provided for in division (B) of section 2108.04
of the Revised Code shall conform substantially to the following forms:
UNIFORM DONOR CARD
OF
Print or type name of donor
In the hope that I may help others, I hereby make this anatomical gift,
if medically acceptable, to take effect upon my death. The words and marks
below indicate my desire.
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I give: (A) any needed organs or parts
(B) only the following organs or parts
Specify the organ(s) or part(s)
for the purpose of transplantation, therapy, or medical research or
education.
(C) my body for anatomical study, if needed.
Limitations or special wishes, if any:
Signed by the donor and the following two witnesses in the presence of each
other:
Signature of Donor




This is a legal document under the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act or similar laws.
ANATOMICAL GIFT BY NEXT OF KIN
OR OTHER AUTHORIZED PERSON
I hereby make this anatomical gift from the body of
(name)
who died on in
(date) (city and state)
The marks in the appropriate squares and the words filled into the blanks
below indicate my relationship to the deceased according to the following order
of priority as presented by Ohio law, and indicate my desires respecting the gift.
1. 1 am the surviving:
1. LI spouse;
2. l adult son or daughter;
3. El parent;
4. El adult brother or sister;
5. l guardian;
6. LI authorized to dispose of the body;
2. 1 give:
L any needed organs or parts;
L the following organs or parts
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3. To the following person (or institution):
(insert the name of a physician, hospital, research or educational institu-
tion, storage banks, or individual);
4. For the following purposes:
DI any purpose authorized by section 2108.03 of the Revised Code;
0 transplantation;
El therapy;
El medical research and education;
5. After the donated organs or parts are removed, the remains of the body shall
be disposed of in the following manner:
• at the expense of the following person:
Dated City and State
Signature of Survivor
Address of Survivor
(B) The statement of gift provided for in division (C) of section 2108.04
of the Revised Code shall conform substantially to the following form:
I hereby make an anatomical gift, to be effective upon my death, of:
(A) LI any needed organs or parts (if you mark this box, go to section (C))
or






HIsTORY: 137 v S 294 (Eff 6-2-78); 139 v H 54. Eff 7-23-81.
§ 2108.11 Transaction involving human tissue not a sale.
The procuring, furnishing, donating, processing, distributing, or using
human whole blood, plasma, blood products, blood derivatives, and products,
corneas, bones, organs, or other human tissue except hair, for the purpose of
injecting, transfusing, or transplanting any of them in the human body, is declared
for all purposes to be the rendition of a service by every person, firm, or cor-
poration participating therein, whether or not any remuneration is paid therefor,
is declared not to be a sale of any such items, and no warranties of any kind
or description are applicable thereto.
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HIsTORY: 133 v H 439. Eff 11-14-69.
§ 2108.30 Death defined.
An individual is dead if he has sustained either irreversible cessation of
circulatory and respiratory functions or irreversible cessation of all functions
of the brain, including the brain stem, as determined in accordance with ac-
cepted medical standards. If the respiratory and circulatory functions of a per-
son are being artificially sustained, under accepted medical standards a deter-
mination that death has occurred is made by a physician by observing and con-
ducting a test to determine that the irreversible cessation of all functions of
the brain has occurred.
A physician who makes a determination of death in accordance with ac-
cepted medical standards. If the respiratory and circulatory functions of a per-
son are being artificially sustained, under accepted medical standards a deter-
mination that death has occurred is made by a physician by observing and con-
ducting a test to determine that the irreversible cessation of all functions of
the brain has occurred.
A physician who makes a determination of death in accordance with this
section and accepted medical standards is not liable for damages in any civil
action or subject to prosecution in any criminal proceeding for his acts or the
acts of others based on that determination.
Any person who acts in good faith in reliance on a determination of death
made by a physician in accordance with this section and accepted medical stan-
dards is not liable for damages in any civil action or subject to prosecution
in any criminal proceeding for his actions.
HISTORY: 139 V S 98. Eff 3-15-82.
§ 2108.50 Post-mortem examination; persons who may give consent.
An autopsy or post-mortem examination may be performed upon the body
of a deceased person by a licensed physician or surgeon if consent has been
given in the order named by one of the following persons of sound mind and
eighteen years of age or older in a written instrument executed by him or on
his behalf at his express direction:
(A) The deceased person during his lifetime;
(B) The decedent's spouse;
(C) If there is no surviving spouse, if the address of the surviving spouse
is unknown or outside the United States, if the surviving spouse is physically
or mentally unable or incapable of giving consent, or if the deceased person
was separated and living apart from such surviving spouse, then a person hav-
ing the first named degree of relationship in the following list in which a relative
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of the deceased survives and is physically and mentally able and capable of
giving consent may execute consent:
(1) Children;
(2) Parents;
(3) Brothers or sisters.
(D) If there are no surviving persons of any degree of relationship listed
in division (C) of this section, any other relative or person who assumes custody
of the body for burial;
(E) A person authorized by written instrument executed by the deceased
person to make arrangements for burial.
Consent may be revoked only by the person executing the consent and in
the same manner as required for execution of consent under this section.
As used in this section, "written instrument" includes a telegram or
cablegram.
HIS-ORY:133 v S 234 (Eff 11-27-69); 134 v S 243. Eff 12-3-71.
§ 2108.51 Exemption from liability.
Any licensed physician or surgeon who, in good faith and acting in reliance
upon an instrument of consent for an autopsy or post-mortem examination ex-
ecuted under section 2108.50 of the Revised Code and without actual knowledge
of revocation of such consent, performs an autopsy or post-mortem examina-
tion is not liable in a civil or criminal action brought against him for such act.
HIS-TORY: 133 v S 234. Eff 11-27-69.
§ 2108.52 Exceptions to requirement of consent for post-mortem
examination.
The requirements of section 2108.50 of the Revised Code do not apply to
a post-mortem or other examination performed under sections 313.01 to 313.22
of the Revised Code, or to medical, surgical, and anatomical study performed
under sections 1713.34 to 1713.42 of the Revised Code.
HISTORY 133 v S 234 (Eff 11-27-69); 136 v H 1. Eff 6-13-75.
§ 210&53 Removal of pituitary gland.
(A) A county coroner who performs an autopsy under section 313.13 of
the Revised Code may, except as provided in divisions (B) and (C) of this sec-
tion, remove the pituitary gland from the body and give it to the national pituitary
agency to use for research and in manufacturing a hormone necessary for the
physical growth of persons who are hypopituitary dwarfs, or to any other agen-
cy or organization to use for such research and manufacturing.
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(B) If the pituitary gland is unnecessary for the successful completion of
the autopsy or for evidence, the coroner shall not alter a gift made by the dece-
dent or any other authorized person under Chapter 2108. of the Revised Code
to an organization.
(C) If the pituitary gland is unnecessary for the successful completion of
the autopsy or for evidence, the coroner shall not remove the pituitary gland
under division (A) of this section if the next of kin of the decedent notifies
the coroner that he objects to the actions of the coroner on the ground that
the actions would violate the tenets of a well-recognized religion.
HISTORY: 137 v S 449. Eff 10-19-78.
§ 2108.60 Coroner who performs autopsy may remove or authorize removal
of eyes.
(A) As used in this section:
(1) "Cornea" or "corneas" includes corneal tissue.
(2) "Eye bank" means a nonp-rofit corporation that is organized under
the laws of this state, the purposes of which include obtaining, storing,
and distributing corneas to be used for corneal transplants or other
medical or medical research purposes, and that is exempt from federal
taxation under subsection 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code.
(3) "Eye bank official" means a person authorized by the trustees of an
eye bank to make requests for corneas to be used for corneal transplants
or other medical or medical research purposes.
(4) "Eye technician" means a person authorized by the medical director
of an eye bank to remove the corneas of a decedent.
(5) "Internal Revenue Code" means the "Internal Revenue Code of 1954,"
68A Stat. 3, 26 U.S.C. 1. as amended.
(B) A county coroner who performs an autopsy, pursuant to section 313.13
of the Revised Code, may remove one or both corneas of the decedent, or a
coroner may authorize a deputy coroner, physician or surgeon licensed pur-
suant to section 4731.14 of the Revised Code, embalmer authorized under sec-
tion 2108.071 [2108.07.1] of the Revised Code to enucieate eyes, or eye techni-
cian to remove one or both corneas of a decedent whose body is the subject
of an autopsy performed pursuant to section 313.13 of the Revised Code, if all
of the following apply:
(1) The corneas are not necessary for the successful completion of the autop-
sy or for evidence;
(2) An eye bank official has requested the removal of corneas and certified
to the coroner in writing that the corneas will be used only for corneal
transplants or other medical or medical research purposes;
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(3) The removal of the corneas and gift to the eye bank do not alter a gift
made by the decedent or any other person authorized under this chapter
to an agency or organization other than the eye bank;
(4) The coroner, at the time he removes or authorizes the removal of the
corneas, has no knowledge of an objection to the removal by any of
the following:
(a) The decedent, as evidenced in a written document executed dur-
ing his lifetime;
(b) The decedent's spouse;
(c) If there is no spouse, the decedent's adult children;
(d) If there is no spouse and no adult children, the decedent's parents;
(e) If there is no spouse, no adult children, and no parents, the dece-
dent's brothers or sisters;
(f) If there is no spouse, no adult children, no parents, and no brothers
or sisters, the guardian of the person of the decedent at the time
of death;
(g) If there is no spouse, no adult children, no parents, no brothers
or sisters, no guardian of the person of the decedent at the time
of death, any other person authorized or under obligation to dispose
of the body.
(C) Any person who acts in good faith under this section and without
knowledge of an objection, as described in division (B)(4) of this section, to
the removal of corneas is not liable in any civil or criminal action based on
the removal.
Is-TORY: 135 v H 415 (Eff 3-27-80); 140 v H 239. Eff 3-28-84.
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12/86 12/87 86 YTD 87 YTD
# Referrals 10 37 63 330
# Donors 5 23 48 279
Eye - 20 - 291
Bone 3 12 13 72
Skin 2 6 6 30
Heart Valve - 3 0 22
Body - 1 0 4
Utilization
Eye:
Cleve. Eye Bank - 12 - 242
Melvin Jones - 8 - 39
Bone:
CCF 3 2 4 23
UH 0 0 6 4
ST. V. 0 0 1 11
Cleve. Red Cross - 7 18
MATC 1 11
Canton Red Cross - 2 5
Skin:
Metro 0 1 3 4
Akron Child. 2 0 5 5
MATC - 1 - 8
Cleve. Red Cross - 3 - 11
Canton Red Cross - 1 - 2
Heart Valve:
CCF - 1 - 13
UH - 2 - 9
Akron City - 0 - 0
Body:
CCF - I - 4
Other - 0 - 0
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Local 12/86 12/87 86 YTD 87 YTD
# Referrals 17 16 151 197
# Donors 5 4 62 65
Kidney 10 8 124 130
Heart 0 0 9 24
Liver 0 0 3 13
Pancreas 0 0 0 6
Denied Consent - 4 51
Med. Unsuitable - 6 78
Inport
Kidney 3 2 44 44
Heart 0 0 4 1
Liver 0 0 4 4
Pancreas 0 0 0 0
Utilization
Kidney:
ACH 1 3 25 25
CCF 5 3 68 63
UH 4 2 42 52
Discard 2 2 13 17
Export 1 0 8 10
Heart:
CCF 1 0 5 12
UH 0 0 0 0
Export 0 0 8 i1
Liver:
CCF 0 0 2 5
Export 0 0 4 10
Pancreas:
UH 0 0 4 6
CCF 0 0 0 0
Export 0 0 0 0
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